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I. Introduction. 
Cross national comparisons indicate that nations differ in the overall 
amount of social movement activity that is supported. For instance, it is 
often suggested that the United States provides more fertile soil for the 
growth of social movements than do other nations. Moreover, over time 
societies differ in the amount of social movement activity that they support. 
Cycles of mobilization for quite disparate causes seem to occur. This total 
amount of social movement activity is the social movement sector. 
Our basic assumption is that to understand the course of social move- 
ments we have to understand them as a configuration and within a determininq 
environment. Thus we have to look at the totality of movements in a society, 
rather than isolated movements, and try to identify the elements of social 
structure that shape this totality of movements (the movement sector). What 
we are proposing is, first, a set of terms 05 conceptual tools for extending 
the analysis of social movements to the SM sector and, second, a set of pro- 
positions for explaining variations in the sector. 
We will define the social movement sector, identify its dimensions, and 
discuss its determinants. Major determinants include the economic base, con- 
junctions of the business cycle and structural change, and the political and 
ideological system. Since the object of analysis is sectors within societies 
our method must be comparative and historical. 
11. Social Movements and The Movement Sector Defined 
A most inclusive definition of a social movement is any sentiment and 
activity involving two or more people oriented toward changes in social re- 
lation or the social system. This most inclusive definition would encompass 
for analysis social movements at any level of social organization (small group, 
formal organization, community, nation). It would also include movements 
aimed at changing social relations through changing individuals, such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous or Proselytizing religious movements. It would treat as 
marginally related or as pre-social movements, sentiments and activities that 
express discontent with the social order but not oriented towards relatively 
spcific or articulated change. Phenomena such as the "beats," the "teddy 
boys," may express discontent with the social order and may be the ground out 
of which social movements grow, but they are peripheral to our analysis. 
This definition is inclusive in another sense--it rests upon sentiments 
for change, rather than amount of mobilization. McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
refer to the situation where there is a sentiment base, but little mobilized 
activity as a latent social movement. 
In this paper we are primarily interested in a sub-set of all social 
movement activity. First, our focus is upon social movement activity 1arge.l~ 
oriented towards change that is achieved in the differentiated political arena-- 
changes in the system of political rule or in the specific policies,symbols, 
and distributional allocations of territorially based authorities. Social 
movements in groups or organizations that are not articulated with pressures 
on formal authorities are outside of our ken. Similarly, social movements largely 
aimed at change through recruiting and changing individuals are also largely 
outside of our ken, unless they articulated with politically oriented activity. 
Stated positively, we are largely concerned with political social movements. 
Some definitions of social movements assume that they operate outside of 
institutionalized channels. For us, here, such an assumption would too limit 
the analysis. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher are connected to Conservative 
social movements. Some social movement sentiments and activities exist whenever 
authorities and their policies are sources of contention. Only if a regime is 
very widely accepted (through either the elimination of dissent or through 
positive socialization, ideological hegemony, and widespread policy success), 
would a society with a differentiated polity have little or no social move- 
ment activity. While we are concerned with social movement activity outside 
of well institutionalized channels and forms, how it articulates with more 
institutionalized political action is part of our problem. 
Given these definitions of a social movement, and accompanying caveats, 
what is the social movement sector? The social movement sector is the 3- 
figuration of social movements, the structure of antagonistic, competing 
and/or cooperating movements which in turn is part of a larger structure of 
action (political action,,in a very broad sense) that may include parties, state 
bureaucracies, the media, pressure groups, churches, and a variety of other or- 
ganizational actors in a society. Configuration refers both to the amount and 
structural relations of social movement activity and the orientation, or goals, 
of action. 
Another definition of the sector is provided by the resource mobili- 
zation perspective of McCarthy and Zald (1977). They define the sector as 
the sum of all social movement industries in the society. A social movement 
industry is the congery of movement organizations oriented toward a similar 
social change goal. Our definition of the sector is more inclusive and less 
"economistic" than McCarthy and Zald's, since it includes all action oriented 
to social movement goals, rather than the action generated by movement or- 
ganizations. It is important to note that if there is only one social move- 
ment in a society, the sector would be coterminous with the movement and counter- 
movement. 
In what societies can we identify a social movement sector? Such a 
sector of activity only appears in societies that have a distinct political 
system. Primitive societies rarely have social movements unless they have 
been integrated into the political or economic system of more developed 
societies; once such contact takes place, rebellions, millenarian cults and 
so on, occur frequently. Traditional societies with distinct political systems 
have sporadic movements - the rise of Islam is one such example. But often 
such movements remain unstable eruptions - a permanent sector does not 
emerge. Movements are especially weak in societies in which class relations 
are highly personalized. A social movement sector is most likely to become a 
permanent feature of the social system in capitalist societies. Distinctively, 
they have a separation of the state from civil society, they have a rational- 
legal bureaucratic authority, and they maintain a large sphere of private vo- 
luntary associations. The more societies are pervaded by rational legal forms, 
the more life focuses on formal organizations; the more people think in terms 
of state and economy, and the more they believe that human action constructs the 
social system - the more a movement sector becomes a permanent subsystem of 
the society. 
111. Dimensions of Social Movement Sectors 
A brief comparison of the social movement sectors of Italy and the 
United States may provide some illustrations that we can use to identify key 
dimensions of social movement sectors, dimensions that describe the structure 
of these sectors in most capitalist democracies.* Let us proceed with a 
thumbnail sketch of the SMS of these two societies. We begin with Italy 
since it is more coherent and hence easier to describe. The entire sector 
is highly politicized and tightly tied to the party system and the state. 
By this term we mean a variety of characteristics: action takes place to 
alter, influence, and/or react to the Italian state; the state is defined as 
the element of the status quo and the main instrument of change; the move- 
ments of the sector are defined on a left/right basis (as Barnes I19771 points 
*The first author, Garner, has conducted research in Italy during 1978. 
out, this is also the case for "the party space"); there are few - essen- 
tially no - religious movements or cults and only a limited number of life- 
style/personal identity movements. The structural underpinnings of this 
condition are complex - we will discuss them later. 
This is quite a different picture of Italian society than the one pre- 
sented by Banfield (1958) and Almond and Verba (1963) who stress the passive 
and alientated features of Italian political culture. we are suggesting an 
alternative view of Italian society, namely a society so highly mobilized by 
parties, unions, corporatist groups and the church, that there is relatively 
little space left for a differentiated movement sector. Of course, the two 
images are not really contradictory (corporatist mobilization may in fact be 
a cause of passivity) and in any case, Italy and particularly Northern Italy, 
is no longer the same society that it was when the earlier studies were done. 
In short, the non-political social movement sector appears relatively small 
and political social movements separate from well-established institutions 
are few; sector activity is encapsulated in party-related political forms; 
the number of unorganized currents is also relatively small; much of the sector 
ovorlaps the institutions of cultural life, universities and the media, probably 
because these are the institutions in which people are most weakly integrated 
into the organs of party and corporate life. The range of issues addressed by 
the SMS is largely secular and political. 
Contrast this situation with the SMS in the US: In comparison to Italy 
it includes a large non-political sector and the political sector is differ- 
entiated from the party system. There are a large number of groups that are 
organized around religious and life style issues, that seem to mobilize around 
issues that have nothing to do with the state; the vast majority of the 400 to 
500 cults (comprising a couple million adults) seem to be largely outside the 
political system in the usual sense of the term. Even groups that have to deal 
with political organizations seem to do so only in a transitory or tactical 
way. The political component as a whole seems to correlate poorly with a right/ 
left political dimension. On the one hand, the range of goals do not reflect 
an easy left/right dimension. On the other, action is aimed at many different 
levels in the system. Many of the movements are localistic and spontaneous 
(i.e., not articulated with larger organizations). whether they are cults, life- 
style currents,neighborhood movements, and so on. 
So in one country we have a relatively structured, highly politicized SMS, 
that is tightly tied to the institutionalized political subsystem. In the 
other country, we have a sprawling and diverse SMS with a low degree of political 
action and often only the most tenuous ties to the state or to other political 
institutions. What we hope to do is to sharpen our understanding of the de- 
terminants of these sectors without elaborating many obvious dimensions (e.9.. 
Italy is a more politicized society, the US is localistic and decentralized,; 
in the US civil society is generally more important than the state, etc.), 
although we think these statements are probably true. 
Let us use these two short sketches to identify what we think are important 
dimensions of the SMS. We repeat that what we are trying to characterize here 
are features of social movement-action as a whole in a society. Some of these 
features are derivable from individual social movements, but others are global 
features and not reducible to characteristics of individual movements. The 
dimensions we have identified are 1) size, 2)  degree of organization, 
3) social location of support and of locus of action, 4) alignment with the left- 
right orientation (singular ideological polarization), and 5) autonomy from other 
institutions, and finally the character of change over time. 
One dimension is &, in terms of the number of organizations and the number 
of participants, both in and out of "the formal organizations." We are mainly 
interested in size relative to other sectors of activity, the more institutionalized 
ones (political parties, churches, etc.) and we are interested in the size of the 
sector compared to its size in other countries and over time.* 
A second dimension of the sector is its degree of organization - roughly 
speaking the ratio of membership in formal organizations to all types of 
participation. In some societies even social movements rapidly take on the 
form of formal organizations and in others they don't. This characteristic 
is important. It gets at issues that Piven is concerned with when she 
examines loosely organized, quasi-spontaneous, poor people's actions. It 
also brings out the difference between dissent and organization which is 
crucial for understanding currents of opposition in the socialist states. 
What type of form is taken on by those movements that do coalesce into 
organizations is also a characteristic of themovementsector as a whole, and 
not merely a characteristic of individual movements. 
The next dimension of the SMS to be considered is its social location. 
There are some obvious structural variables here - class, region, ethnicity - 
which locate the groups that are most easily mobilized. Another way of 
charting social location is by the locus of action,institutions and settings 
in and around which social movements emerge. We think of these as "weak link" 
,institutions, institutions in which basic societal tensions or contradictions 
appear. A weak link institution is characterized by a destabilized, or de- 
stabilizable system of social control, a mobilizable population and a set of 
focal grievances at the center of contention between authorities and the 
relevant population. In the last few decades (we are tempted to say, since 
the early 19th century with its nationalist youth movements) the universities 
and high schools have been a major institutional site for a variety of reasons: 
because here social psychological problems ("youth") intersect class phenomena 
(the volatile petty-bourgeoisie) and both in turn intersect contradictions 
of capitalism (the tension between advanced training and actual job prospects, 
whether those of unemployment or alienated labor). Burawoy has identified the 
contradictions that precipitate movement action in the university of a de- 
veloping nation (to wit, Zambia) in an article that contributes to the concept 
of "weak link" institutions, of locations in the institutional structure where 
social movements erupt. 
1 
Social movement sectors also vary in their alignment with a left-right 
political spectrum (Barnes, 1977). This alignment is historically based in 
the amount of class conflict and the extent to which politics is heavily po- 
larized along class lines. Such alignment is also related to the extent to 
which the movement sector is politicized at all. Note that one could have 
a highly politicized, strongly left-right aligned movement sector that did 
not "adhere" to the political institutions but to some other set of insti- 
tutions (like the educational ones). We will see shortly that this may happen 
in those societies in which it is difficult to enter the political arena. 
Nevertheless, the sector may be politically aligned, and may be defined in re- 
lation to existing political actors (parties, interest groups) including the 
state or parts of the state itself. 
Another dimension of the SMS is its degree of autonomy from other organi- 
zations and sectors (especially the political system), not only in terms of 
member overlap but also in terms of strategies and structural linkages. The SMS 
may heavily overlap institutions such as those of religion or education. 
It is clear that some of these dimensions have more to do with the amount and 
organization of.the sector (size, organization, autonomy) and others have more 
to do with the orientation of the sector, social location of support and left- 
right orientation. The sector may change over time in these characteristics 
'piven has identified the welfare system as a weak link institution 
(Piven, 1976), and Hirsch has commented on the shift from the workplace 
to the community as a "weak link" in advanced capitalism. (Hirsch, 1979) 
'There are problems in measurement here, since social movement activity 
does not preclude other kinds of activity. 
in one country, but be more or less impervious to change in another society. 
This leads to our final dimension. An important dimension of the SMS is the 
character of its change over time. In some societies the SM sector's size, 
organizational structure and content (its issues and ideological foci) vary 
markedly over time and seem sensitive to economic changes and social control 
pressures. In others, even though action and movement organization may fluc- 
tuate, the sector maintains its integrity. This can most clearly be seen by 
comparing Italy and the US in the 1950's. This was a period of relatively 
low activity in both countries but in Italy the traditions and sentiments under- 
lying the SMS were not disrupted (although perhaps decreasing organizational 
activity) while in the US they were. In other words, the Cold War and accom- 
panying social control produceda deactivationof social movements in the US 
but not in Italy. In part these differences are results of the role of mass 
left wing parties in Italy which are absent in the US. 
To illustrate this dimension of change over time we will trace through 
a set of changes in an actual movement configuration, that of the post- 
war US. We will treat the phenomenon somewhat discontinuously -- by decade -- 
when in fact it should be viewed more continuously. 
The late 1940's and 1950's were characterized by a slowing rate of move- 
ment formation. Left-wing movements were becalmed, shrank, and fell into 
sectarian isolation while right-wing movements had an increasing effect on the 
political system, often operating through existing political institutions (as 
in the case of HUAC and McCarthyism). The center of gravity shifted decisi- 
vely rightwards. Less politicized and pre-movement forms emerged to draw on 
the energies of youth; youth culture, in both its commercialized and spon- 
taneous forms,.juvenile delinquency, and cultural phenomena like the Beats con- 
stituted these pre-movement currents of discontent. 
By the 1960's and the 1970'9, the conjuncture of political and demo- 
graphic change and the war in Vietnam fueled a new wave of movements. The 
social movement sector expanded rapidly in the number of movements, the growth 
of social bases of movements, and the institutional loci of movements (es- 
pecially in universities). The left shook off its sectarian becalmed state and a 
variety of broad based coalitions functioned to confront issues of the war and 
the political economy. The target of these movements was changes in laws and 
government policies; the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement were 
the leading forces. As the civil rights struggle was won by the 1960's it be- 
came clear that the economic (as opposed to the legal) disadvantage of blacks 
was not so easily altered; black nationalism and a critique of American capi- 
talism emerged as the two alternative conceptualizations of the economic im- 
passe. Meanwhile other groups who saw themselves as oppressed in American 
society - especially women, homosexuals, and a variety of ethnic minorities - 
organized movements. Labor remained rather silent in this uproar; for the 
time being the heated-up war economy diminished the grounds for labor-capital 
disputes over economic issues. 
By the late 19701s, demographic shifts and economic stagnation led to new 
types of disputes as well as a general decline of movement activity. Localistic 
and corporatistic forms (like neighborhood organizing) vainly tried to cope 
with fiscal crisis and regional shifts. The center of gravity - t'he ability 
to define issues and set agendas - shifted to the right. Televangelism and 
fundamentalistic church involvement in conservative politics became important 
movement phenomena. At the same time the mass public showed marked shifts 
toward a sense of disaffection and delegitimation of both political and social 
institutions, with the linked and only superficially inconsistent growth of 
political conservatism and social liberalism. To use Riesman's terms, the moral 
entrepreneurs (whether on the left in the 1960's or on the right as in the 
70's and 80's) seem curiously at odds with a growing mass of "new-style 
political indifferents." Movements and counter-movements locked in combat 
contributed to politics as spectacle. 
What interests us here are the overall shifts (the relative weight of 
the left and the right and the way in which these weights are related to each 
other), the patterns of social movement organization and tactics (including 
their propensity to form coalitions and their modes of competition), the 
social and institutional bases of the movements, and their effects. These 
variables are not reducible to characteristics of individual movement organi- 
zations but are characteristics of a larger whole or system composed of the 
totality of movements within a structure of political action. 
These are the types of variables that we want to explain. We want to 
identify the structural constraints, the structural factors external to 
social movements, that shape this configuration. However, in an over-determined 
system it is difficult to rigidly separate external constraints from the object 
of analysis itself - a determining factor shaping the SMS may be the prior 
action of social movements (and thus, not strictly speaking, an "external" 
constraint). 
In the next section we identify the major types of constraints. 
IV. Systemic Constraints 
By systemic constraints we mean those characteristicsof the environment 
of social movements that shape and limit the possibilities for social move- 
ments. These constraints, or determinants, to a large extent exist apart from 
the volition of individuals; yet some, but certainly not all, may be instrumental, 
i.e. based on deliberate policy decisions or the outcomes of courses of action 
that are translated into elements of the social structure. 
systemic Constraints: Determinants of Sector Configuration 
At the most general level of analysis the politically oriented social 
movement sector is determined by the number and size of social categories with 
infra-structures of social relations, interpersonal networks, community struc- 
ture and formal organization with mobilizable resources that develop actionable 
issues (see Tilly's discussion, 1978). The number of categories that are 
mobilizable into the bases of social movements are quite large and vary from 
society to society. But it is clear that the major categories which are turned 
into competing cleavages across modern societies are those related to economic 
structure, race and ethnicity, religion, regional cleavages, and to a lesser 
extent, sex and age. In a more complete treatment of the determinants of the 
orientation of the social movement sector we would take each cleavage-category 
and ask how and when it turns into a major determinant of social movement sector 
orientation. For instance, it is apparent that class, and even ethnic, issues 
are submerged in the social movement sector when groups unite to overthrow 
colonial domination. And recently Nagel and Olzek have begun to synthesize a 
large number of historical cases to show how ethnicity emerges, reemerges, 
and reconstitutes itself as a social movement-political issue. Working off Barth's 
(1969) and Hannan's (1979) work on ethnic competition, they show how increased inter- 
dependence leads to increased competition for jobs and resources amongst pre- 
viously segregated groups. Nagel and Olzek go beyond Barth and Hannan by con- 
sidering how the changing structure of and policies of national and inter- 
national governments provide political opportunities for mobilization and for 
resource support and advantages to be gained. It would be possible, then, to begin 
by asking how is.the social movement sector shaped by ethnicity and ethnic change, 
treating economic bases in:less detail. Instead, we will begin by examining how 
the economic and class systems shape the social movement sector, treating ethnicity 
in passing. 
We have organized our discussion of systemic constraints into the following 
sections: 
(1) the patterning of productive activities and associated class 
relationships and processes that we refer to as the structure 
or base; 
( 2 )  the cyclical phenomena that overlap structural changes and 
produce a patterning we call conjunctural factors. 
(3) the political and ideological system. 
(1) The Structure of the Economy and Class Relations 
Our first category we refer to as the base of productive activities and 
its corresponding social relationships. By this we mean the structure of the 
economy -- patterns of ownership, size and type of productive enterprises, 
relations between a public and a private sector, nature of work relations and 
management within enterprises, forms of the labor market, types of employment 
and occupation, wage scales and income distribution, and the political asso- 
ciations concerned with production. We will also consider parts of the system 
of "reproduction of the relations of production," that is to say, the articulation 
of the family, community, and socialization process with the mode of pro- 
duction (Althusser, 1971). 
We will not identify all the features of the base but only a sampling of 
those that we believe are the most important constraints on 'social movements. 
A. Class Structure: Conflict, Stressed Positions, Changing 
Positions and Contradictory Positions. 
A classic method of movement analysis is to identify the social base 
of a particular movement. Expanding this method to the analysis of a whole 
configuration of movements, we can point out how the system of class positions 
in a society shapes (some would even say, determines) the configuration of social 
movements. The configuration of social movements changes as new classes appear 
and other classes decline or lose their positions of dominance. 
1. The social bases of movement sectors. 
Classes do not rise and decline as separate entities any more than do 
movements. As the class structure of society changes so does the social 
movement sector. 
There are many studies of the social base of single movements or related 
types of movements:forexample, the working class has supported a variety of 
left wing movements (Hobsbawm, Abendroth); the declining traditional petty- 
bourgeoisie has given rise to a status group politics (Gusfield) and has s u p  
ported fascist and authoritarian movements; smallholders (in certain respects, 
a special kind of petty-bourgeoisie) have been extensively involved in move- 
ments (Heberle, Stinchcombe, Hofstadter, Vann Woodward); the new stratum of 
employed technical and professional workers was associated with the New Left 
of the 1960's (Mallet, Gorz). 
The analyses that interest us most are those that examine how a change in 
the productive system is associated not just with one class and its accompanying 
movement but with a new set of classes and their inter-related movements. 
For example, the emergence of capitalist agriculture in the 20th century 
in the Po Valley generated- leftwing movements of agricultural laborers 
and the fascist movement supported by the agro-capitalists; the origins of 
Italian fascism were in paramilitary groups which attacked the organizations 
of the laborers in that region. A new organization of production generated 
a set of movements -- more precisely, movements and counter movements (Cardoza). 
For a rather different example we might cite the way in which the Italian 
Communist Party developed a base after World War I1 in the traditional petty- 
bourgeoisie in those regions (Tuscany, Emilia Romagna) where the PC1 has a strong 
base in the industrial working class and a non-owning rural population. (Here 
we are dealing with a party rather than a movement, but a party with many move- 
ment characteristics.) The configuration of the base - the interaction of 
classes in a particular economy - generates a corresponding political confi- 
guration of class coalitions. In regions where the working class is strong, 
the petty-bourgeois middle strata ("ceti medi") often support the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) -- which in turn can consolidate its hold on local govern- 
ment and provide further incentives to the ceti medi to support the PCI; where 
the working class is weak - especially in the South and the rural areas of 
the Veneto, and the PC1 (or left coalitions) has little power, the ceti medi 
support the Christian Democrats (DC) ,  often even the right wing of the DC. 
Thus there is no simple relationship of a single class to a single poli- 
tical position1 the political action of any given class is contingent on the class 
structure as a whole and the political action of other classes. 
2. Contradictory class positions 
So far we have discussed the relationship of classes to social movements 
(and political action generally) as though class positions were relatively 
clearly identifiable. But it is important to recognize that class position is 
not unambiguous and that some positions may be particularly ambiguous and contra- 
dictory (Wright, NLR). Middle strata are especially likely to be in contradictory 
positions and thus it is not surprising that these strata have shown a high level 
of volatility, movement action and often variable or even unpredictable poli- 
tical behavior. 
At the level of the individual, a contradictory class position (as dofined 
by Wright) may mean high levels of cross pressure, or role strain. At the level 
of the class, movement action may be volatile. 
We are particularly interested in seeing contradictory class position as 
a structural feature of a whole system. A society with a large number of contra- 
dictory class positions may be prone to instability and movement volatility. 
Since advanced capitalism seems to generate large blocs of contradictory po- 
sitions (like the employed petty-bourgeoisie mentioned earlier) its patterns of 
movement activity may be more unstable and spasmodic than the movement activity 
of the late nineteenth century (which was characterized by what now seem the 
relatively predictable actions of the expanding proletariat and the declining 
traditional petty-bourgeoisie). 
B. The Structure of the Economy: The Dual Economy and the Social 
Movement Sector. 
Instead of conceptualizing the base as a structure of class relations we 
can think of it in more conventional terms, as the organization of the economy. 
The organization of the economy shapes social movements (as it in fact shapes 
the whole sphere of political action). 
We will focus on the economy of the United States (and other advanced 
capitalist countries). The economy has two private sectors: a monopoly sector 
of very large enterprises (some of which are actually monopolies, while others 
are oligopolies) and a competitive sector of small capital. In a number of 
Western European countries (England, France, Italy) the monopoly sector also 
depends on large amounts of state investment; in the United States it is more 
substantially private. In any case, the monopoly or concentrated sector has 
strong unionization (although not all monopoly enterprises are strongly unionized). 
Unions and employers in the monopoly sector have had the understanding that 
productivity increases can occur as long as presently-employed workers will be 
protected from technological layoffs (OgConnor) .' The large corporations can use 
technological innovations to increase output without hiring more workers. The 
social costs of this pattern of uneven development, so the theory goes, are borne 
by the workers of the competitive sector, when the specific industries are not 
expanding, and by unemployed youth and others in the "reserve army of labor." 
Ultimately, the state (i.e. taxpayers) has to pay some of the costs in the form 
of public assistance, police protection, and other measures aimed at the problems 
of the mass of unemployed, unemployable, and marginally employed people. 
This particular configuration of the economy in turn generates a particular 
configuration of social movements. The working class is divided into a stably 
employed unionized part and an un- and/or marginally-employed part, with objec- 
tively different interests. The "embourgeoisement" of the former is not just 
a mind-set but corresponds to the patterns of economic organization, including 
union strength, skill level, state investment, etc. The privileged sector of 
the working class thus opts for continued corporatist union action at the work- 
place. As citizens and taxpayers, privileged workers take a somewhat dim view 
'1n 1982 it is apparent that oligopoly and monopoly must be seen in their 
international context. Many industries that looked protected from the winds 
of competition just a,decade ago, now seem fragile. 
of the demands of the unprivileged sector for welfare, although they do 
support measures like the minimum wage. In short, they adhere to union corpora- 
tism and are relatively unlikely to engage in social movements outside the 
established political organizations. When they do support social movements, 
union leadership may use the social movement as part of inter-union turf 
building, or may transcend their members' commitments and interests (Wood, 1981). 
The unprivileged sector of the working class behaves in a diametrically 
opposite way. It is prone to localistic, violent and weakly-organized actions, 
such as the ghetto riots of the 1960's or the clashes between groups of unem- 
ployed men in Naples in the spring of 1978. Since one of its characteristics 
is that its links with production are weak, many of its actions do not take 
place at the workplace but at other social sites, such as the neighborhoods or 
the high schools. The pattern is precisely the one described by Piven and 
Cloward -- spasmodic action, volatility, little stable organization, little 
national organization, often high levels of violence; unlike Piven and cloward, 
we do not see these characteristics as virtues but only as the results of 
desperation. 
These actions (when they are not purely destructive lashing out, little 
distinguishable from crime) frequently function like those of the pre-industrial 
urban mob, that is, they signal to the state that it must carry out some type 
of short term remedial program (Hobsbawm). Thus they raise the costs of the 
state and the taxpayers and may give rise to reactionary sentiments, if not 
reactionary movements. 
There is considerable national variation within this overall pattern. 
One source of variation is the overlap of the dual economy with mejor 
lines of cleavage, such as race, ethnicity, age.and sex. In many Northern 
European countries the lower half of the working class is substantially com- 
posed of foreign workers; thus unemployment can be "exported" to the home countries 
of these workers -- as John Berger remarks, unemployment is one of Switzer- C. The State of the Economy: A System of Limits. 
land's most valuable exports. There is correspondingly little social movement 
activity within the country. When guest workers are absorbed into the monopoly 
sector (as for instance in German auto plants) they have been relatively well 
integrated into the union structure and so far have not constituted an inde- 
pendent movement base. 
A second common pattern of the dual economy is a division by region so 
that one geographical area has a disproportionate share of the "lower working- 
class." For example, in Italy it has traditionally been the south; within 
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Macedonia as opposed to Croatia and Slovenia. This 
geographical division in turn gives rise to a variety of problems and corres- 
ponding social movements. For instance, in Yugoslavia, the Croatian nationalist 
stirrings of 1971 were fueled by Croatian resentment at having to pay the costs 
of developing the South. In other cases, migration has brought "emarginati" 
into the more developed metropolitan areas. 
A third possible pattern is the overlap of race/ethnicity and the dual 
economy so that blacks and Latinos are disproportionately in the lower half. 
This split labor market phenomenon creates movements which are often also ethnic 
or even "nationalist" movements, while the corporatist actions of the pri- 
vileged sector become "institutionally racist." (Bonacich). 
Finally, an important consideration in thinking about the effect of the dual 
economy on social movements is the role of the state and the major parties. 
The state or major parties try to remedy the imbalances, setting off movements 
in the privileged regions or among ethnic groups to hold on to their relative advan- 
tages, at the same time that government policy creates opportunities for collective 
action on the part of subordinate ethnic/racial groups. The state and/or parties 
may also create quasi-movements, or "professional" movements among the poor to CO- 
opt them as in the various War on Poverty agencies (Helfgott). 
The economic system and class relations generate the social movement sector 
not only by producing a pattern of classes and class-connected interest groups 
with their grievances; but the functioning of the economy also shapes the social 
movement sector by constituting a system of limits for social movement action. 
For example, the Portuguese economy acted as a limit for the leftward shift 
and the upsurge of left movements following the revolution of 1974. This limit 
was manifested in the high rate of inflation that followed the successes of 
left movements; the structural limit was translated into political action on 
the one hand by the voting behavior of middle strata and the Northern small- 
peasant proprietors and on the other hand by International Monetary,Fund 
pressures for austerity. A similar example is provided by Jamaica: the left- 
ward shift undertaken by Manley (in a "creeping revolution") ran into the li- 
miting factor of Jamaica's economy; once again the limiting situation was 
translated into the experience of an economic downturn, IMF pressures and con- 
sequent voting behavior. 
What the limiting effect of the economy means for movements is that the 
"real alternatives" that they can propose and pursue (if they come to power) 
may not correspond to the position of their larger support base and/or their 
own militants. For example, the PC1 moved rightward on economic and inter- 
national issues in the 1970's, losing some support from its militants. As it 
clearly lost its opportunity to enter the government (after 1978) it has been 
able to return to a position of stiffer economic opposition. It is now further 
from a situation of actually participating in the direction of the Italian 
economy, with its ,strong potential for an investment strike by capital. 
'~lthough we are primarily analyzing capitalist societies, it will be 
interesting to observe similar economic limiting processes at work in Poland, 
where they will probably "cool down" the new movement sector. 
As resource mobilization theorists have stressed, the tactics and other 
behaviors of movements in the SMS are thus not simply reflections of the 
underlying sentiment-support base but also reflect the structural possibili- 
ties of the system. 
D. Thc Embedding of National Structures in the Global Political Economy. 
The discussion above makes explicit that the orientation of the sector 
is also shaped by the global political economy. In many cases, military 
and paramilitary intervention supplement economic pressures. In the vicissi- 
tudes of national liberation movements in Africa or the problems of the left 
in Latin America, we do not need to look for an invisible hand of structural 
constraint; the hands of the large powers are all too visible. Or, to take 
another example, the strategy of the PC1 in Italy was largely set by the de- 
cisions made at Teheran and Yalta and on the battlefields: Once Italy was 
clearly in the Western sphere of influence, the PC1 was under great pressure to 
take the Via Italiana to socialism, the "Italian way" of participation within 
the framework of bourgeois democracy. 
Social movement analysis by sociologists has usually focused upon mo- 
bilization within a single nation state. But it is important to emphasize 
that the leading issues may be defined across national borders. Social'move- 
ment activity in one nation provides a template, a possibility for change 
to relevant groups in other nations. Not only the idea on model of change, 
but a flow of personnel, weapons, and resources may flow across national 
borders. It was true in the American revolution, in Allende's Chile, and in 
the rash of movements of 1968. 
E. The Economic Base and the Reproduction of the Relations of Production: 
the Articulation of Two Sub-systems. 
Accompanying the base there must be a system for reproducing and per- 
petuating the relations of production. In part, this sytem consists of a 
political and ideological superstructure (which we will examine later) but 
in part also of more homely institutions like the community, the family, con- 
sumption, behavior,and the school. The concept of a system of reproduction 
of the relations of production (RRP) is fully developed in Althusser and 
we will not define it further. 
1. Life style choice 
The RRP can be very closely linked to the system of production. For 
example, in the company town or in the cities of early industrial capitalism 
(like Manchester or the New England mill towns) the conditions of community 
and family life are set directly by the conditions of production. Housing, 
schooling, consumption, even procreation and recreation exist only to fill 
the industrialists' need for a labor force. (In a slightly different way, 
production and RRP are closely linked in societies like feudalism and Hindu 
castesociety in which class position dictates the terms of everyday life, 
down to minutiae of clothing and food, with no room for free choice or 
personal taste). 
An important feature of advanced capitalism is the relatively high degree 
of autonomy of production from RRP. It reaches its greatest degree of autonomy 
in the consumer society in which "the customer is king"; the possibility of a 
free play of taste, whim, impulse and choice has become a major legitimating 
formula for advanced capitalism. The ideology of "everyone can 
be a small businessman" -- i.e., realize himself in the sphere of production -- 
no longer holds; it has been replaced by the promise of choice of richly varied 
life styles. 
This relatively large gap between production and RRP is manifested 
in the large number of available consumer goods, relatively large amounts 
of leisure time, physical separation of the workplace and other spheres of 
life, and a high degree of free choice in life styles (including patterns of 
family life). Thus life style, consumption, family life (in a broad sense 
of "family"), and community life not only take up a large part of each in- 
dividual's time, but also become psychologically weighty areas of choice. 
This gap between production and RRP means that there is a large space 
for movements that deal with community problems, with life style choices, 
and with self-definition. This gap has been particularly characteristic of 
American capitalism and has permitted the florid development of identity, 
life style, moralistic and community movements. These movements (from 
theosophy to Gay Liberation) are movements that appear to lack an economic 
base but that are in fact made possible by the loose articulation between 
production and RRP. In thissense, they are a product of the structure of 
advanced capitalism. 
2. Social networks and communities 
A second important feature of the articulation of production and the RRP 
is that not only are stable class life styles being replaced by free choice, 
but also that social networks and class communities (Linenwebber) are loosening 
up. Especially in the United States, the social networks that in the past or 
in more stable societies assured a continuity of class and political identi- 
fication and participation (of the kind found by Portes in the Chilean working 
class) arc weak. The weakening of such social networks may also be related 
to migration and to the existence of a large number of contradictory class 
positions. This breakdown or weakening of social networks also creates possi- 
bilities for movements of "self definition" or life style choice. 
3. "Weak-link'' institutions 
As we noted above, "weak link" institutions are those where conflicts or 
contradictions appear. Stable systems of social control break down, a mobill- 
zable population with grievances is at hand. A third element of the articulation 
of production with RRP is that conflicts in the productive system may be shifted 
to institutions of the RRP. 
In the late nineteenth century, the system of production itself was still 
clearly a socially weak link in capitalism. The workplace was often the site 
of disorder -- strikes, riots, etc. Class conflict could be clearly secn as 
class conflict because it took place at the point of production. By World 
War 11, a series of social inventions (e.g., scientific mnagement, assembly 
lines and other technological innovations, corporatist unions) had strengthened 
the "link" of production. Even if disputes over working conditions and wages 
evidence themselves in recurring strikes, the conflict is contained as part 
of a legitimated bargaining negotiation. System stress shifted to other points, 
particularly to the state and to certain institutions in the RRP -- especially 
the schools, as the sites of selection or labeling for class position (Coleman, 
Stinchcombe, Cicourel and Kitsuse, Bowles and Gintis, etc.). The schools have 
had to bear the burden of multiple contradictory functions: selection as a pro- 
cess must go on while at the same time the school has to perpetuate an ideo- 
logy of upward mobility for many, if not for all; the school also has to cope 
with the problems of adolescence and in recent years has become more and more 
of a "parking lot" in which people are kept out of the overcrowded labor market. 
Under conditions of mass youth unemployment (especially in Italy and England) 
even the selection function has broken down. Thus, the school is typically a 
weak link institution and many social movements start there or are acted out 
there: the lunch counter sit-ins, the anti-war movement, May ' 6 8  in France, the 
destructively anti-authoritarian actions of the Italian "autonomi," etc. 
Summary: The Structure of the Economy and Class Relations. 
We have put forward a large number of propositions, let me summarize 
some of the main points. 
1. The more theeconomic base takes the form of a dual economy, the more: 
a. poor people's movements become distinct phenomena. 
b. the harder it is to build unified movements of all the 
subordinate classes and strata. 
c. many movements take on the form of corporatist interest groups 
with the upper working class organized into defensive trade 
unions, and the lower working class organized into ethnic pressure 
groups and/or "poor people's" uprisings. 
2. The more autonomy there is in the RRP from the relations of pro- 
duction (via suburbanization, marketing, and a consumer ideology): 
a. the more identity and life-style movements will emerge (e.g., 
gay liberation, "pro-choice" and "Right to Life," feminism, 
the Moral Majority, etc.). 
b. the more movements will be residence or life-style based, 
rather then workplace based, a development that coincides with 
those discussed in #1 above (Hirsch). 
c. the weaker reinforcing overlapping social networks will become, 
coinciding with the disintegration of traditional working class 
culture (Hirsch, Linenwebber). 
d. the more the "weak-link" institutions, the points at which 
conflict occurs, shift from the workplace to the institutions 
of the RRP. The educational system bears special stress because 
it is increasingly a selection site in which assignment to one 
or the other part of the dual labor market occurs. 
3 .  The more contradictory class positions there are in the society 
the larger the number of movements, the less clear their class bases, and 
the more volatile the sector as a whole. 
4 .  The structure of the social movement sector is not a product of class 
support bases that are independent of each other, but of a structure of inter- 
related classes. For example, class conflict generates a polarized social 
movement sector. 
5. The limits to political action imposed by an economic system force 
movement goals (and tactics) away from the sentiments of the support base. 
6 .  The social movement sector exists in a global political economy. 
The sector in one society is responsive to the international economy, to 
models provided by social movement sectors in other nations, and to a flow 
of personnel and resources. 
2. Economic Change: Phases of Capitalism and the Business Cycle. 
In the previous section we linked the shape of the social movement sector 
to the structure of the economic system. Our attention to change in the 
orientation and structure sector as a function of change in the economic system 
was treated at best in passing. Moreover, in the broad view, the transformation 
of the sector is equally, or simultaneously, responsive to the transformation 
of polities, the growth and spread of national political systems, the elabor- 
ation of government and the incorporation of groups into the polity (see 
Tilly, et al., 1975; Gamson, 1975). Thus, the task is herculean. But we do 
want to suggest at least sketchily how the transformation or phases of capitalism 
and swings in the business cycle relate to the transformation of the social 
movement sector. 
were replaced by more secular nationalist movements (Worsley). The peripheral 
Crisis in capitalism induces new phases of resolution with reorganization 
of the mode of production and the political system (Wright, Hobsbawm, S. Amin). 
There is a large body of literature that indicates that each phase of capital- 
ism had had its characteristic technologically-advanced industries (for example, 
first textiles, then railroads, then automobiles and other metal processing, 
then petro-chemicals and electronics); its characteristic leading nation-states 
and a corresponding structure of the world economy (first Britain, then the 
expansion of a variety of imperial powers with colonies, then the neo-colonialism 
or "imperialism without colonies" headed by the United States); its character- 
istic forms of capitalist enterprise (the small competitive firm, the oligopoly 
and monopoly, the multinational); and its characteristic forms of capital-state 
relations (from laissez-faire, to support and protectionism, to fascism and 
New Deal politics, to a Keynesian policy that carries the systems to the brink 
of state capitalism) (Mandel, Hobsbawm, Wright). Each phase of technological 
dynamism and expansion is followed by a period of stagnation; the stagnation 
and crisis is resolved by a re-organization of industry, by new forms of geo- 
graphical expansion, by new forms of support from the state, and by new tech- 
nologies. These resolving mechanisms in turn create new problems, setting the 
stage for new crises. 
Distinct phases of capitalism have also had distinct effects in different 
regions of the world (Wallerstein). Particularly in the periphery and semi- 
periphery the intrusion of capitalist social relationships set off millenarian 
movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the period of classical 
imperial expansion (Worsley, Lanternari, Hobsbawm). In some of these regions 
(Brazil, Southern Italy), this process was accompanied by social banditry 
as well (Hobsbawm). After World War 11, the millenarian movements declined and 
areas do not simply go through the same stages of modernization as the center, 
just at a later date; they have a different line of development, including 
different social movement patterns, because of their particular history of 
integration on unfavorable terms into the world economy (Wallerstein, etc.). 
Below is a sketchy rendering of some of the major phases and accompanying 
social movements. 
In the phase of early industrial capitalism (1780-18301, only the be- 
ginnings of working class movements can be discerned among the British working 
class. The concerns of the bourgeoisie are still conflicts with landed inter- 
ests. Petty-bourgeois radicalism in its Jacobinist and Jeffersonian mani- 
festations is strong. Working class movements shift from the anti-mechanization 
movements of artisans and agricultural workers to more political and nationally- 
organized forms like Chartism. 
Industrial capitalism is consolidated by a series of upheavals from 
1848 to 1870. The emancipation of slaves and serfs, the unification of Italy, 
the extension of voting rights are among the accomplishments of these "last 
bourgeois revolutions" in a phase of economic expansion. 
The triumph of the bourgeoisie sets the stage for severe conflicts and 
a high level of movement activity between 1870 and 1914. This is the period 
of "labor wars" in the emerging monopoly industries in developed nations (such 
as railroads, steel, and mining). It is the period of movements of farmers 
against railroads and other monopoly industries. Coalitions of workers and 
petty-bourgeois succeed in further extending voting rights and other elements 
of democracy (Therborn, 1977). The mass based socialist parties of Europe are 
organized and grow rapidly. In the periphery, millenarian movements take place 
in response to colonial expansion. 
During the interwar period of relative economic stagnation working- 
class movements grow but take on more institutionalized forms: labor unions, 
mass socialist parties, and the Communist parties associated with the Comintern 
appear. As a response to both capitalist crisis and working class political 
power, fascist movements with a petty-bourgeois base appear to try to deal 
with both the long-term decline of the petty-bourgeoisie, its short-term crises, 
and the threat of proletarian organization. The movements in the periphery 
shift from millenarian visions to more political forms, usually nationalist 
and sometimes socialist. In the most prosperous of the advanced industrial 
countries, the United States, lifestyle movements appear on a mass scale, 
spurred by affluence and the rising media industries. 
In the phase of post war developed capitalism (1945-1968), working class 
movements are contained, both repressed in the Cold War atmosphere and paid 
off in a long wave of economic prosperity. Life style movements expand in 
consumer societies. But the nationalist movements of the periphery finally 
gain de jure control of territory and resources (if not always de facto) 
setting the stage for new focus of conflicts on a global scale; Vietnam, 
Angola, Cuba, Iran, the rise of OPEC, and so on are symptoms of this inter- 
nationalization of movements and conflicts. 
As can be seen, each phase also has its characteristic social movements. 
These are important ingredients in the precipitation of crises (for instance, 
worker's movements may raise labor costs, putting a squeeze on profits; 
national liberation movements may lead to the dissolution of colonial empires 
and consequent economic problems in the metropoles) but also in their resolution 
because they are one of several mechanisms for translating socio-economic strains 
into new policies of the state (thus movements of the unemployed and movements 
of union expansion were a factor in bringing about New Deal policies). 
Let us examineafew examples of these distinct phases of social movement 
configurations. The period during which monopoly capitalism emerged 
(1870's-1914) was also a period of "labor wars," one of open class conflict 
that often took place at the point of production; we have already cmented 
on these movements in the context of the expansion of the working class 
and again in the context of how the workplace was a1'weak link" institution 
in which new social relations were being imposed and resisted. This period 
was also the period of farmers' movements in the United States as farmers 
responded to the squeeze put on them by railroads and the national and 
international agricultural markets. 
Similarly, another phase of capitalism, the crises phase of 1917-1939. 
had a distinct set of accompanying social movements; the fascist movements 
of the petty-bourgeoisie in decline (with some support from rising agro- 
capitalists and industrialists) and largely defensive movements of the 
industrial working class. These movements were important factors in the 
"outcome" of this period: World War 11, the reorganization of the world 
economy, and increased state intervention in national economies. This example 
suggests some of the value of examining the SMS as opposed to each movement 
separately. The outcome of state intervention that appears throughout 
the western world in this period is primarily neither a product of working 
class pressure for an increased social wage (as some might interpret some 
aspects of the New Deal) nor of fascism (i.e., of increased regulation of 
the economy for the benefit of corporate capital with the backing of the 
petty-bourgeoisie); rather,the outcome is a structural effect of the economic 
downswing and the entire configuration of social movement activity (movements 
and countermovements) generated by the downswing. 
One can read from the historical record the relation of phases of 
capitalism to the size and shape of the social movement sector. Major move- 
ment forms appear linked to the transformation of the political economy. 
And crises of the political economy are tied to swings in the business 
cycle, to rampant inflation, to large depressions which feed the demands for 
change. Is it possible to argue that the business cycle has systematic 
linkages to the leftward or rightward shift of the social movement sector? 
For the early part of this century, we would probably have argued that u p  
swings in the United States were associated with conservative revivals, and 
downswings with increased unemployment with left-oriented movements. Yet 
the issue is more complex than this, and any attempt to treat the relation ' 
of the business cycle in fine to the social movement sector must raise a 
host of considerations. Some of the relevant items that need to be con- 
sidered can be drawn from studies of strike behavior and industrial conflict 
and from the relation of political choice and election results to the state 
of the economy. 
We now know that for Western countries the volume of strike behavior 
increases as unemployment falls, or, conversely, the incidence and duration 
of strikes decrease as unemployment rises. With slightly less certainty we 
know that as real wages decline (in the face of inflation) strike rates increase 
(Hibbs, 1976, 1978; Cronin, Edwards). A couple other relevant findings: 
strike rates have systematically declined only in those countries where labor 
is well incorporated in a stable and dominant political coalition (Hibbs). 
But strike rates do not necessarily relate to social movement activities. 
Yes, unions feel they can demand less, and actually win less in recessions. 
Yes, capital can drive harder bargains. But that doesn't necessarily drive 
political and social movemement.surges left.or right. 
Tufte (1978) has shown how negative events in the economy affect voting in 
the United States. The "ins" lose, as the economy sours. 
What this suggests is that the short-run oscillation of the economy 
will affect the left-right dynamics of the social movement sector, depending 
upon who is in power and who is blamed for the current state of the economy. 
Several other consequences of business cycle action should be noted. 
First, we suspect that large downswings in the business cycle crowd out non- 
economic oriented social movements. Conversely, prolonged upswings may 
encourage a proliferation of other kinds of social movements both because 
more discretionary resources come available for social movement usage, and 
because non-economic issues - matters of life-style, personal taste, 
general ideology - can occupy the public arena: 
Second, the major phases of capitalism and the smaller phases of business 
cycle can join together and the resolution and polities choices lead to struc- 
tural change which sets the ground for the next phase and shape of the social 
movement sector. (Hibbs, 1 .  
Finally, although crises of capitalism and extreme problems created by 
business cycles fuel social movement mobilization, the direction and breadth 
of movement goals depends upon ideological and organizational factors and regime 
response as much as upon economic conditions per se. 
3. The Political and Ideological System. 
In the long haul of the transformation of modern society, social movement 
mobilization has been reactive to the attempts of authorities and the state to 
intrude upon local and traditional arrangements, and, at later stages, proactive 
in making demands upon the state and seizing opportunities provided by the state. 
Thus, understanding how the political system determines and constrain the social 
movement sector is a fundamental problem. (Tilly, et. al.) 
( 3 )  The P o l i t i c a l  and I d e o l o g i c a l  System 
We use t h e  term " p o l i t i c a l  system" i n  a  more o r  l e s s  commonsensical 
way. I n  advanced c a p i t a l i s m  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system has  some degree  o f  
autonomy ( a  r e l a t i v e  autonomy, compared t o  feudal ism,  f o r  example).  
There is no s h a r p  boundary between " s o c i a l  movements" and o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n ;  p o l i t i c a l  sys tems d i f f e r  i n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
is organized i n t o  s o c i a l  movements, i n t o  p a r t i e s ,  and i n t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
of t h e  s t a t e  appa ra tus .  One o f  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of r e sou rce  mob i l i za t ion  
theo ry  has  been t o  s t r i k e  down t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between s o c i a l  movements 
( " b i z a r r e ,  i r r a t i o n a l ,  marginal ,  and sepa ra t e " )  and o t h e r  forms of p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  l i k e  p a r t i e s ,  government agenc ie s ,  o r  p r e s s u r e  groups 
( " r a t i o n a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d " ) ;  RM theory has  shown us t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n s  
o f  s t r a t e g y  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  and t h a t  i n  f a c t  movements 
a r e  on ly  one type  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a c t i o n .  We accep t  t h i s  approach even 
when we t r e a t  some p a r t s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system a s  e x t e r n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on s o c i a l  movements. The p o l i t i c a l  and i d e o l o g i c a l  system is a  major 
de t e rminan t  o f  t h e  shape of t h e  SMS. The n a t u r e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system 
viewed a s  an e x t e r n a l  c o n s t r a i n t  can b e  used t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  dimension o f  
t h e  SMS t h a t  we r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  " t h e  degree  o f  formal  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  
movements" and t h e  predominant forms o f  such o rgan iza t ion .  The p o l i t i c a l  
system p r e s e n t s  c e r t a i n  c o n s t r a i n t s  on movement s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c s ,  
manifes ted i n  p a t t e r n s  o f  movement o rgan iza t ion .  (Przeworski ,  1980) 
Beyond t h i s  i s s u e  o f  s t r a t e g y  l i e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  is t h e  major 
i n s t rumen t  o f  coercion i n  t h e  s o c i e t y .  I n  s o  f a r  a s  many s o c i a l  movements 
s eek  t o  impose a  v i s i o n  on a  whole s o c i e t y ,  on a  popu la t ion  t h a t  cannot  
always be  persuaded a s  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  s o c i a l  movements must use  t h e  s t a t e .  
A. C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and Decen t r a l i za t ion  
The e x t e n t  t o  which a  p o l i t i c a l  system is c e n t r a l i z e d  o r  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
shapes  s o c i a l  movements by presentingdifferenttargets f o r  s o c i a l  movement 
a c t i v i t i e s .  C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  has  a  s p a t i a l  dimension ( i . e . ,  l o c a l  t o  
n a t i o n a l ) ,  and a  f u n c t i o n a l  dimension ( i . e . ,  r e l a t i v e  autonomy and r o l e  o f  
execu t ive ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ) .  
I n  a  h igh ly  c e n t r a l i z e d  system l o c a l  movements can win few v i c t o r i e s .  
As long a s  budgets  a r e  s e t  n a t i o n a l l y ,  p r e f e c t s  a r e  c e n t r a l l y  appo in t ed ,  
laws a r e  a p p l i e d  n a t i o n a l l y ,  and p a r t i e s  o p e r a t e  a s  d i s c i p l i n e d  n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  r a t h e r  t han  a s  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  l o c a l  no tab le s  -- t h e r e  is 
l i t t l e  p o i n t  i n  pu re ly  l o c a l  movements. France i s  a  case  i n  po in t .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  system o f  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s ,  laws 
and r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  s e t  a t  t h e  s t a t e  and l o c a l  l e v e l ,  l o c a l  u n i t s  have 
r a t h e r  l a r g e  f i s c a i  and r e g u l a t o r y  power, p a r t y  p o l i c y  is made by negot ia-  
t i o n  between l o c a l  powerholdersi t h u s  l o c a l  movements can win v i c t o r i e s .  
"Grassroot ing t h e  system" (Perlman) is a  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  
(a l though an i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n l i k e l y  one because  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy) 
b u t  would make l i t t l e  sense  i n  France. 
I t a l y  r e p r e s e n t s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  in t e rmed ia t e  c a s e ,  a l though c l o s e r  
t o  t h e  French than  t h e  American s i t u a t i o n .  The abor t ion  movement i n  I t a l y  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  complexity o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  The d e c i s i o n  t o  a l low a b o r t i o n  
was made n a t i o n a l l y ,  i n  pa r l i amen t ,  a long p a r t y  l i n e s ;  u n l i k e  t h e  u n i t e d  
S t a t e s  no l o c a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  laws were made, nor  was t h e r e  a  b reach  of p a r t y  
s t a n d s  by i n d i v i d u a l  l e g i s l a t o r s .  Thus, t h e  movement t o  l i b e r a l i z e  a b o r t i o n  
had t o  be a  n a t i o n a l  one. However, t h e  new l e g i s l a t i o n  has  t o  be  implemented 
l o c a l l y ,  i n  h o s p i t a l s i  t h e r e  is a l r eady  evidence t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be  cons ide rab le  
v a r i a t i o n  w i t h i n  I t a l y  w i t h  poor  women i n  conse rva t ive  r e g i o n s  v i r t u a l l y  den ied  
whi le  t h e  b e t t e r - o f f  and those  i n  more modernized a r e a s  w i l l  be  a b l e  t o  
o b t a i n  them. Thus, we can expec t  more l o c a l  movement a c t i v i t y  around 
t h i s  i s s u e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  a l though g e n e r a l l y  s t i l l  under t h e  umbrella 
o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  women's o rgan iza t ions .  
Not on ly  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s ,  p a r t y  s t r u c t u r e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  may be 
c e n t r a l i z e d  b u t  a l s o  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  appa ra tus .  For  example, TV, r a d i o ,  and 
e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  may be d i r e c t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  regime. Where 
they  a r e  c e n t r a l i z e d  they  a r e  a  p o s s i b l e  t a r g e t  f o r  n a t i o n a l  movements -- 
e s p e c i a l l y  movements c o n s t i t u t e d  a s  p a r t i e s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  i n  I t a l y  t h e  
l e f t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  PC1 and PSI)  won a  v i c t o r y  when it g o t  Channel 2 ,  a  
" l e f t "  government channel  d i s t i n c t  from t h e  more r i g h t  DC-oriented 
Channel 1. S i m i l a r l y ,  movements o r  p a r t i e s  may a t t empt  t o  cap tu re  o r  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f  educa t ion  i n  s o c i e t i e s  i n  which t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  
appa ra tus  is c e n t r a l i z e d .  These n a t i o n a l  t a r g e t s  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
movements i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ;  however, l o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( l i k e  t h e  schoo l s  
o r  l o c a l  r a d i o  s t a t i o n s )  may be e a s i e r  t o  i n f luence .  
C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  may a l s o  be unders tood f u n c t i o n a l l y  
i n  terms o f  t h e  powers o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o v e r  each o the r .  For 
example, s p e c i f i c  a c t s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  may make c o u r t s  more o r  l e s s  amenable 
a s  avenues f o r  s o c i a l  movement ac t ion .  Nelkin and P o l l a k  (1980) show 
t h a t  t h e  an t i -nuc lea r  power movement was much more s u c c e s s f u l  i n  Germany 
than  i n  France because  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  allowed t h e  c o u r t s  i n  Germany, 
b u t  n o t  i n  France,  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t t e r s .  
Because t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  economy is n a t i o n a l  ( i f  n o t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l )  
i n  scope,  s o c i e t i e s  w i th  a  h igh ly  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  p o l i t i c a l  system expe r i ence  
a  cu r ious  s t r u c t u r a l  s t r e s s .  There is an e lement  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  t e n s i o n  
( i f  n o t  i n d i v i d u a l  s o c i a l  p sycho log ica l  t e n s i o n )  between t h e  n a t i o n a l  
economy and t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  l o c a l ,  community, neighborhood, and 
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"g ra s s roo t s "  movements, which a r e  t hus  o f t e n  futile..+ The c l e a r e s t  example 
o f  such f u t i l i t y  is t h e  i s s u e  o f  l o c a l  d i s inves tmen t .  When l o c a l  movements 
succeed i n  p u t t i n g  l i m i t s  on t h e  accumulation p rocess  (e .g . ,  by r a i s i n g  
co rpora t e  t a x e s ,  b lock ing  r a t e  h i k e s ,  imposing h i r i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  union- 
i z i n g  p l a n t s ,  changing u t i l i t y  r a t e  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  such a  way a s  t o  r a i s e  
c o s t s  t o  b u s i n e s s ,  e t c . ) ,  c a p i t a l  d i s i n v e s t s  and "moves south." (Th i s  
p roces s  is a l s o  happening a t  an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  showing t h e  con t r a -  
d i c t i o n  between t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy and p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n t o  
na t ion - s t a t e s . )  Of cour se ,  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  t o  d i s inves tmen t  because  
c a p i t a l  is n o t  t o t a l l y  f l e x i b l e ,  g iven  investment  i n  p l a n t s .  In  a  more 
u n i t a r y  s t a t e  l i k e  I t a l y ,  l a r g e  c a p i t a l  has  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  reason t o  move 
around geograph ica l ly  w i t h i n  t h e  country  ( a l though  i t  may f l e e  abroad)  
s i n c e  it o p e r a t e s  w i t h i n  a  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  system o f  t a x a t i o n ,  un ion iza t ion ,  
r a t e  s t r u c t u r e s ,  e t c .  (This  is l e s s  t r u e  o f  sma l l  c a p i t a l  which l o c a t e s  
i n  c i t i e s  l i k e  Naples t o  t a p  low-wage l a b o r  and s p e c i a l  Favors from l o c a l  
p o l i t i c i a n s . )  
0 .  Legal C o n s t r a i n t s  on S o c i a l  Movements: C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s  and 
S o c i a l  Con t ro l  
An obvious  c o n s t r a i n i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system i s  t h e  e x t e n t  
t o  which t h e  s t a t e  p e n n i t s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  OF s o c i a l  movements and l i m i t s  
t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  r e c r u i t  and o rgan ize  p u b l i c l y ,  
t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  o rgan ize  a s  p a r t i e s  o r  f a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  p a r t i e s ,  t h e i r  r i g h t  
t o  launch media o f  op in ion ,  and t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  engage i n  c e r t a i n  t a c t i c s  
(demonstra t ions ,  s t r i k e s  o f  v a r i o u s  t y p e s ,  e t c . ) .  
There is a  broad spectrum o f  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  i n  terms o f  t h e  s t r e n g t h  
and e f f i c a c y  o f  s a n c t i o n s ,  and i n  terms o f  t h e  t a r g e t s  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
l i b e r t i e s .  I t  is more u s e f u l  t o  t h i n k  of a  range o r  spectrum than  o f  a  s imp le  
dichotomy: l i b e r a l - t o t a l i t a r i a n .  For example, w i t h i n  t h e  c l e a r l y  
r e p r e s s i v e  end o f  t h e  range,  F a s c i s t  I t a l y  was neve r the l e s s  much " loose r "  
than Nazi Germany. I n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  every type o f  oppos i t i on  p a r t y  o r  
movement was crushed,  wh i l e  i n  t h e  former, some oppos i t i on  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
cont inued t o  e x i s t .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1943, widespread s t r i k e s  
a g a i n s t  piecework r a t e s  were organized by t h e  PC1 and t h e  spontaneous  e f f o r t s  
of workers throughout  Northern I t a l y  -- un th inkab le  i n  Germany. 
Not o n l y  does  t h e  n a t u r e  and e f f i c a c y  o f  s a n c t i o n s  vary b u t  a l s o  t h e i r  
t a r g e t ,  an i m p r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  s h i f t i n g  t h e  weight  o f  s o c i a l  movements t o  
t h e  l e f t  o r  t h e  r i g h t .  The r i g h t  t o  o rgan ize  may be p a r t i a l l y  o r  complete ly  
r e s t r i c t e d  f o r  c e r t a i n  types  of movements. For example, t h e  BRD's be ru f sve rbo t  
( t h e  d e n i a l  o f  government jobs  t o  people  o f  vaguely subve r s ive  l ean ings )  
is i n  p r a c t i c e  a p p l i e d  f a r  more v igo rous ly  a g a i n s t  t h e  l e f t  (Communist 
p a r t y  members b u t  a l s o  p a c i f i s t s  and even l e f t  wing s o c i a l i s t s )  t han  a g a i n s t  
t h e  r i g h t .  I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  laws may e x p l i c i t l y  r e s t r i c t  c e r t a i n  types  o f  
movements. In  I t a l y  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  r e c o n s t i t U t i o n  o f  a  f a s c i s t  p a r t y  
is s p e c i f i c a l l y  i l l e g a 1 , a l t h o u g h  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e s e  laws have n o t  been very 
v igo rous ly  a p p l i e d ;  t h e  MSI is known t o  be f a s c i s t  i n  program and even 
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n t i n u i t y  y e t  is a. recognized p a r t y ,  and members o f  more 
extreme groups  ( l i k e  Ordine Nuovo) have been charged b u t  acqu i t t ed .  S t i l l ,  
t h e  Sce lba  law and its more r e c e n t  v a r i a n t s  do p u t  a  damper on f a s c i s t  
movements and s h r i n k  t h e  "space" a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  f a r  r i g h t .  
I n  t h e  absence o f  a l l  o r  most c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s ,  movements may t a k e  t h e  
form o f  c u r r e n t s  of op in ion  t h a t  a r e  h a r d l y  movements excep t  i n  a  very  
a b s t r a c t  o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  sense .  Such has  been t h e  case  wi th  "d i s sen t "  
i n  E a s t e r n  Europe and t h e  beginnings  o f  t h e  women's movement i n  pre-1974 
Por tuga l ,  exempl i f i ed  by t h e  " t h r e e  Marias." Such movements t hen  t end  t o  be  
conf ined t o  a  sma l l  c u l t u r a l  e l i t e  and have l i t t l e  a b i l i t y  t o  communicate 
w i th  t h e  l a r g e  mass. Of cour se ,  t o t a l i t a r i a n  regimes canno t  always ma in ta in  
t h e i r  i r o n  hand, p a r t y  c o n t r o l s  may become i n e f f e c t i v e ,  semi-autonomous 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such a s  t h e  church may s h e l t e r  nascen t  movements. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  l e s s  developed s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e  absence o f  democracy 
o f t e n  produced f o l k  c u l t u r e s  o f  oppos i t i on  o r  b a n d i t r y  ( l i k e  t h e  Greek 
"band i t s "  who fought  t h e  Turks o r  t h e  Southern I t a l i a n s  who opposed 
no r the rn  c a p i t a l  through b a n d i t r y )  o r  even cr ime ( l i k e  t h a t  of B r i t i s h  lower 
c l a s s e s  i n  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry ) .  Absenteeism and low p r o d u c t i v i t y  a r e  
t h e  responses  o f  workers who a r e  n o t  allowed t o  s t r i k e .  
C. The Re la t ion  o f  t h e  P r i v a t e  and P u b l i c  S e c t o r s :  P o l i t i c i z a t i o n , ,  
Co-optation, C l i e n t a l i s m ,  and "Manageable Movements" 
1. P o l i t i c i z a t i o n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
Movements a r e  s t r o n g l y  cons t r a ined  by t h e  ex tens iveness  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r s ,  a l though t h e r e  a r e  no s imp le  formulae t o  s p e l l  o u t  
t h e  e f f e c t s .  On t h e  one hand, i n  s o c i e t i e s  i n  which t h e r e  i s  an e x t e n s i v e  
p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  t h e r e  is a l s o  more l eg i t imacy  f o r  s u b j e c t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  s c r u t i n y  and a c t i o n .  Soc ie ty  t ends  t o  be more p o l i t i c i z e d .  
I t a l y  is a  good example o f  such a  s i t u a t i o n .  The major TV and r a d i o  s t a t i o n s  
a r e  government-run ( a l though  P r i v a t e  s t a t i o n s  have inc reased  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s )  and 
thus  a r e  assumed t o  r e p r e s e n t  p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s .  There is a  
l a r g e  amount o f  s t a t e  investment  (about  60%) and t h u s  investment  p o l i c i e s  
a r e  a  m a t t e r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d i scuss ion .  
The Uni ted S t a t e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, is a  s o c i e t y  wi th  a  s m a l l e r  
p u b l i c  s e c t o r .  Consequent ly ,  m a t t e r s  l i k e  media p o l i c y  o r  investment  
p a t t e r n s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  make p a r t  o f  p u b l i c  d i scuss ion .  Des i r e s  t o  a l t e r  
them have d i f f i c u l t y  o p e r a t i n g  d i r e c t l y  through t h e  p o l i t i c a l  system. 
I n s t e a d ,  e i t h e r  t hey  have t o  a c t  a s  p r i v a t e  p r e s s u r e  groups d i r e c t e d  
a t  t h e  networks o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  o r  t hey  have t o  engage i n  a  p r i o r  a c t i o n  
o f  l e g i t i m a t i n g  government i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  For 
example, i n  I t a l y ,  TV programming f o r  t h e  two governmerlt channels  
is a  p o s s i b l e  t o p i c  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i t i c a l  deba te ;  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  i t  
is a  ma t t e r  e i t h e r  of pu re ly  p r i v a t e  vo lun ta ry  group a c t i o n  o r  it can be  
p o l i t i c a l l y  i n f luenced  on ly  a f t e r  an  ex tens ion  o r  more s t r i n g e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  government r e g u l a t o r y  powers. Thus t h e  t a c t i c s  and t h e  l e g i t i m a t i n g  
formula f o r  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  two systems have t o  be  d i f f e r e n t .  ( ~ o t e  t h a t  t h i s  
dimension i s  t o  s ane  degree  r e l a t e d  t o  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  i n  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  
more c e n t r a l i z e d  c a p i t a l i s t  s t a t e s  l i k e  France and I t a l y  a l s o  have re-  
l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r s . )  
2. C l i e n t a l i s m ,  co -op ta t ion ,  and "manageable movements" 
The ex tens iveness  o f  t h e  s t a t e  s e c t o r  i s  a l s o  expressed i n  t h e  
s t a t e ' s  p ropens i ty  t o  launch quasi-movements and coun te r  movements. 
Some c a p i t a l i s t  s t a t e s  ( l i k e  t h e  Nazi and F a s c i s t  s t a t e s )  were h igh ly  
a c t i v i s t ,  c r e a t i n g  a  l a r g e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  youth  groups  and c o r p o r a t i s t  
groups. Even where independent movements, p a r t i e s  o r  unions a r e  n o t  
r e s t r i c t e d  o r  banned, t h e s e  s ta te-sponsored s t r u c t u r e s  may d r a i n  
r e sources  from them. 
The s t a t e  may m k e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  suppor t  p a r t i c u l a r  movements, 
e n t e r i n g  i n t o  r e l a t i o n s  of c l i e n t l l i s m  o r  co-opta t ion wi th  them. For example, 
i n  t h e  1960 's  t h e  American government was ready t o  a i d  a  v a r i e t y  o f  poor 
peop le ' s  movements and groups  ( Jenk ins  and Perrow) and even t o  c r e a t e  its 
own co-opt ive  quasi-movements ( H e l f g o t t ) .  The r e s u l t  is f r e q u e n t l y  t o  
c r e a t e  movement p r o f e s s i o n a l s  (McCarthy and Zald)  and t o  c o n f i n e  t h e s e  
movements t o  r e l a t i v e l y  narrow ends. 
Moreover, s t a t e  a c t i o n  may reshape group boundar ies .  Nagel f i n d s  t h a t  
c o a l i t i o n s  among n a t i v e  American t r i b e s  is l a r g e l y  a  response t o  changes  i n  
f e d e r a l . p o l i c y ,  who can make claims,how t h e  government w i l l  e n t e r t a i n  p roposa l s .  
I t a l i a n  p o l i t i c s  i nvo lves  a  ve ry  e l a b o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  such c l i e n t a l -  
i s t i c  groups ,  many o f  them c r e a t e d  o r  nu r tu red  by t h e  DC. When t h e  DC is i n  
power, t h i s  c o r p o r a t i s t  s t r u c t u r e  is l a r g e l y  p a s s i v e  and c l i e n t a l i s t i c ,  r e -  
c e i v i n g  f avor s .  When t h e  DC is o u t  o f  power l o c a l l y ,  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  is ac- 
t i v a t e d  l i k e  a  dead man swi t ch  t o  f i g h t  f o r  its o l d  handouts ,  undermining 
e f f o r t s  a t  reforms f o r  a  more u n i v e r s a l i s t i c  and p r o g r e s s i v e  system o f  s e r v i c e s  
t h a t  t h e  l e f t  (PC1 o r  c o a l i t i o n s  o f  Communists, S o c i a l i s t s  and sma l l e r  l e f t  
groups)  t r i e s  t o  launch. The PC1 has  responded by b u i l d i n g  up i t a  own s t r u c t u r e  
o f  groups ,  w i th  a  suppor t  base  i n  t h e  s t a b l e  working c l a s s  -- and i n  i t s  Red 
B e l t  s t rongho lds ,  a l s o  among pet ty-bourgeois .  I t  has  been l e s s  eage r  and a b l e  
t o  o rgan ize  among t h e  "emarg ina t i , "  t h e  poor. 
L e f t  movements t end  t o  p r e s s  f o r  ex t ens ion  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  (more 
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r y ,  more p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s ,  e t c . )  b u t  such expansion w i t h i n  
t h e  framework o f  c a p i t a l i s m  o f t e n  does  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  reforms 
sought  by t h e  l e f t  (Garner and Garne r ) .  Rather ,  t h e  r e s u l t  is e i t h e r  a  stream- 
l i n i n g  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  c a p i t a l  (Garner,  Kolko) and/or an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  a  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  c o r p o r a t i s t  c l i e n t a l i s m ,  i nc lud ing  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  manageable 
quasi-movements, which become an  important  element i n  t h e  s o c i a l  movement s e c t o r .  
D. P a r t y  S t r u c t u r e  
P a r t y  s t r u c t u r e  i s  probably  t h e  s i n g l e  most important  v a r i a b l e  f o r  under- 
s t and ing  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  s o c i a l  movements. Movements can on ly  be  unders tood 
a s  one p a r t  o f  a  range o f  o p t i o n s  t h a t  a l s o  inc ludes  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  
Movements compete wi th  p a r t i e s .  Movements i n f i l t r a t e  p a r t i e s .  P a r t i e s  s p i n  
o f f  movements, e i t h e r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  o r  i n  t h e  p rocess  o f  f a c t i o n a l i z i n g .  
Movements appear  w i t h i n  p a r t i e s .  Movements become p a r t i e s .  
Both a r e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms f o r  pursuing p o l i t i c a l  ends ,  s o  i t  is no t  
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t hey  a r e  s o  c l o s e l y  in t e r tw ined .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  -- i n s o f a r  a s  t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  a t  a l l  -- 
seems t o  l i e  i n  t h e  use  o f  "pa r ty"  t o  mean an o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h a t  has  a  method 
o f  g a i n i n g  some degree  o f  power o v e r  t h e  s t a t e  appa ra tus  (whether by e l e c t i o n s  
o r  r e v o l u t i o n )  wh i l e  "movements" seem more o r i e n t e d  t w a r d  c i v i l  s o c i e t y .  
(But even t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  is p rob lema t i ca l  -- t h e  Armed Forces  Movement 
o f  Po r tuga l  i n  1974 appeared i n  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  coe rc ive  appa ra tus  
i t s e l f  ( s e e  Bandiera ,  1976) .  We g e n e r a l l y  w i l l  u se  "par ty"  t o  mean an  or-  
g a n i z a t i o n  t h a t  competes i n  e l e c t i o n s ,  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  p a r t i e s  
t h a t  a r e  s o l e l y  r evo lu t iona ry  and p a r t i e s  t h a t  c o n t r o l  a  s t a t e  appa ra tus .  
We might a lmos t  s ay  -- party:movement :: church : s e c t .  The former 
( p a r t y ,  church)  a r e  more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .  There a r e  many ways i n  which 
p a r t y  s t r u c t u r e  a f f e c t s  movements. 
1. Ease o f  s t a r t i n g  p a r t i e s  
Where launching a  new p a r t y  is r e l a t i v e l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  con- 
s t i t u t i o n a l  reasons  -- e.g . ,  t h e  number o f  s i g n a t u r e s  r equ i r ed  t o  g e t  on 
a  b a l l o t ,  t h e  s i n g l e  member d i s t r i c t s  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e l y  r u l e  o u t  minor i ty  
p a r t i e s ,  i l l e g a l i t y ,  e t c .  -- movements a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  become p a r t i e s  
(Duverger) .  A good i l l u s t r a t i v e  c o n t r a s t  is provided by t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  
where movements r a r e l y  become p a r t i e s  and 4 t h  Republic France wi th  a  pro- 
l i f e r a t i o n  o f  p a r t i e s ,  many o f  which were movement-like. Even where l e g a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on minor i ty  p a r t i e s  do  no t  e x i s t ,  t r a d i t i o n  and/or pat ronage 
may c l o s e  o f f  "space" f o r  p a r t i e s  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  major e s t a b l i s h e d  ones. 
Rephrased i n t o  r e source  mob i l i za t ion  terms -- t h e r e  i s  no p o i n t  i n  
pu r su ing  an e l e c t o r a l  s t r a t e g y  i f  t h e  payof f s  a r e n ' t  worth  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
o f  becoming a  p a r t y  and mounting a  campaign. 
When movements become p a r t i e s  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  o f t e n  changes. For 
example, a s  t h e  PC1 became i n c r e a s i n g l y  o r i e n t e d  t o  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s  i n  
t h e  l a t e  1950 's ,  it s h i f t e d  from a  c e l l  s t r u c t u r e  ( f o r  p e n e t r a t i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  of c i v i l  s o c i e t y )  t o  a  s e c t i o n  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  t y p i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  I t a l i a n  e l e c t o r a l  p a r t i e s .  
2. Organ iza t ion  o f  p a r t i e s  
The n a t u r e  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p a r t i e s  impinges on movements. Where, 
a s  i n  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  l a r g e l y  conge r i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  groups  
wi th  l i t t l e  n a t i o n a l  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  a  party. l i n e ,  i t  makes good s e n s e  f o r  a  
movement t o  expend e f f o r t  on becoming an i n t e r e s t  group w i t h i n  a  p a r t y .  
T h i s  s t r a t e g y  may a l low it t o  have some i n f l u e n c e  on p a r t y  s t a n d s  and u l t i -  
mately  on n a t i o n a l  p o l i j r  i n  "its a r e a  of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n "  wi thou t  making too  
many compromises. This  s i t u a t i o n  t ends  t o  induce many movements organized 
t o  a c t  a s  i n t r a - p a r t y  i n t e r e s t  groups each wi th  l i m i t e d  s p e c i a l i z e d  (and t h u s  
u s u a l l y  c o r p o r a t i s t )  goa l s .  Movements may even become lobby l ike  wi th  s t a f f s  
o f  movement-professionals and l a r g e  p e r i p h e r i e s  o f  m a i l i n g - l i s t  s u p p o r t e r s  
who a r e  o c c a s i o n a l l y  mobi l ized.  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, where p a r t i e s  a r e  s t r o n g l y  c e n t r a l i z e d , n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( n o t e  o v e r l a p  wi th  t h e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  v a r i a b l e )  w i th  p a r t y  
d i s c i p l i n e  and a  p a r t y  l i n e  ( l i k e  t h e  PC1 and t h e  PCF), movements a r e  l e s s  
l i k e l y  t o  e n t e r  t h e  p a r t y  a s  i n t e r e s t  groups .  The movements f i n d  t h e  
p a r t i e s  impermeable. I n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  even becomes 
reversed:  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  be ing  composed o f  movements and i n t e r e s t  
groups ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  c r e a t e  quasi-movements t o  a t t r a c t  par- 
t i c u l a r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  I n s t e a d  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  c r e a t i n g  movements 
t o  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  c r e a t e  i n t e r e s t  groups t o  woo 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  -- f o r  i n s t a n c e  t h e  youth groups  o f  t h e  PC1 and t h e  PCF. 
Of cour se ,  s e v e r a l  o f  t h e s e  p rocesses  may go on a t  once. The I t a l i a n  
women's movement i l l u s t r a t e s  some o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  complexi t ies .  I n  its 
organized form ( a s  opposed t o  i t s  l a r g e r  g e n e r a l  s en t imen t  base )  i t  has  two 
major o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e  UDI and t h e  MLD. The UDI (Unione d e l l e  Donne 
I t a l i a n e )  i s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  PC1 b u t  autonomous from i t ;  it is no t  a  f r o n t  
group b u t  a  group w i t h  some o v e r l a p  i n  membership and wi th  s i m i l a r  
pragmat ic  s t a n d s  and a  s t r o n g  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  p o l i t i c a l  and economic r i g h t s .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  MLD i s  more e x p l i c i t l y  f e m i n i s t ,  more concerned w i t h  
i s s u e s  o f  men-women r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i d e n t i t y  and r o l e ,  s e x u a l i t y ,  e t c .  
I t  is n o t  c l o s e  t o  any o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  (wi th  t h e  p o s s i b l e  excep t ion  o f  t h e  
sma l l  Radical  P a r t y )  and weak i n  terms o f  any d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  on p o l i t i c a l  
and economic d e c i s i o n s .  
P a r t i c u l a r  mechanisms o f  p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  shape t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  
p a r t i e s  t o  movements. For example, t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p r imar i e s  t ends  t o  weaken 
p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e .  A s t r o n g  h o l d  on pat ronage jobs ,  even i n  t h e  absence o f  
i d e o l o g i c a l  d i s c i p l i n e ,  s t r e n g t h e n s  p a r t y  u n i t y  and makes a p a r t y  l e s s  open 
t o  movements (Wilson) .  
Because Americans a r e  accustomed t o  a  very  loose  p a r t y  s t r u c t u r e ,  t hey  
tend t o  s e e  d i s c i p l i n e d  p a r t i e s  a s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  and t o  s e e  p a r t y - a f f i l i a t e d  
groups a s  f r o n t s  o r  puppet groups. Europeans i n  t u r n  s e e  American p a r t i e s  
a s  decep t ive ly  shape le s s .  Because t h e  American p a r t i e s  a r e  n o t  committed 
t o  anything a s  a  p a r t y ,  t hey  a r e  a t  t h e  mercy o f  t h e  more powerful of t h e  
i n t e r e s t  groups  o f  which they  a r e  composed. For i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  Republican p a r t y  t ends  t o  be  s e t  by c a p i t a l ;  some concess ions  on 
s p e c i a l  i s s u e s  may be made t o  s p e c i a l i z e d  groups  ( p r o  o r  an t i - abo r t ion ,  
I s r a e l  lobby, o r  whatever) .  
The und i sc ip l ined  n a t u r e  o f  American p a r t i e s  makes them h o s p i t a b l e  t o  s o c i a l  
movements. Lacking a  s i n g l e  d e c i s i v e  comprehensive i d e o l o g i c a l  v i s i o n  o f  
t h e  world  (such a s  is approximated even by t h e  more p ragmat i c  oE t h e  Euro- 
mmmunist p a r t i e s  o r  by Mrs. Tha tche r ' s  Conse rva t ives ) ,  t hey  can abso rb  
and l end  suppor t  t o  s i n g l e  i s s u e  movements, and promote t h e s e  g o a l s  once 
t h e  p a r t y  is i n  power. A good example is t h e  success  t h a t  t h e  Right t o  L i f e  
movement has  achieved i n  g e t t i n g  Republicans t o  suppor t  i ts cause. 
The more d i s c i p l i n e d  p a r t i e s  may however s p i n  o f f  movements, f a c t i o n s  
t h a t  r e b e l  a g a i n s t  t h e  p a r t y  l i n e  (Zald  and Ash, 1966) ;  aga in  t h e  analogy 
t o  t h e  church / sec t  is sugges t ive .  E.g., p a r t s  o f  t h e  French and I t a l i a n  
l e f t  a r e  sp in -o f f s  from t h e  C o m u n i s t  p a r t i e s .  
Here i s  a  b r i e f  o u t l i n e  o f  some o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  movement- 
p a r t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  w i th  examples: 
1. Movements become p a r t i e s :  
J e f f e r s o n i a n  Democratic-Republicans, c l u b s  wi th  an 
ideology o f  suppor t  f o r  t h e  French Revolut ion - 
Democratic P a r t y  
Farmers'  movements + P o p u l i s t s  
European s o c i a l i s t  movements+ S o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s  
2. Movements become i n t e r e s t  g roups  w i t h i n  p a r t i e s :  
.Women's movement i n  t h e  1972 Democratic p a r t y  
3. Movements p r e s s u r e  p a r t i e s  e x t e r n a l l y :  
I t a l i a n  women's movement p r e s s u r e s  PC1 
4. P a r t i e s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  g e n e r a t e  movement-like o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
which may o r  may n o t  become autonomous: 
Youth groups o f  t h e  Communist p a r t i e s  
S o c i a l i s t s +  League f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  DemocracY-+origins 
o f  SDS 
Communist P a r t y ,  U.S.A.---+ U~employed c o u n c i l s  i n  e a r l y  1930 ' s  
5. P a r t i e s  o rgan ize  a  g r o u p o f  e x i s t i n g  movements i n t o  a  f r o n t :  
Vietnamese Communist Pa r ty  a s  gu id ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  
b roade r  Na t iona l  L ibe ra t ion  F ron t  
6. P a r t i e s  f a c t i o n a l i z e ,  g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  movements: 
Communist p a r t i e s  break away from S o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s  a f t e r  
t h e  Russian Revolut ion 
T r o t s k y i s t  p a r t i e s  and movements s p l i n t e r  from Communist p a r t i e s  
7. P a r t i e s  i n f i l t r a t e  movements (CP i n  union d r i v e s )  
V. Epi logue:  The American and I t a l i a n  S o c i a l  Movement S e c t o r s  
Reappraised 
We r e t u r n  t o  t h e  comparative m a t e r i a l  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  
of sys t emic  c o n s t r a i n t s :  A comparison o f  t h e  I t a l i a n  and American s o c i a l  
movcment s e c t o r s  w i l l  show how t h e  determining f a c t o r s  produce d i f f e r e n t  
outcomes. 
The United S t a t e s  is c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  d u a l  economy i n  which t h e r e  
is a  s t r o n g  super- imposi t ion o f  e t h n i c i t y  and l a b o r  market p o s i t i o n .  The 
r ep roduc t ion  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  product ion is r a t h e r  " d i s t a n t "  from t h e  
system o f  p roduc t ion ,  w i t h  a  h igh  degree  o f  suburban iza t ion ,  a  long p e r i o d  
o f  emphasis on consumption, a  geograph ica l  d i s p e r s i o n  o f  working c l a s s  
communities,  and a  g e n e r a l  weakness o f  working c l a s s  c u l t u r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
The p o l i t i c a l  sys tem is d e c e n t r a l i z e d  and focused on two major p a r t i e s  
n e i t h e r  of which is unambiguously c lass-based.  
I t a l y  is l i k e w i s e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  d u a l  economy b u t  one organized 
a long r e g i o n a l  (and t o  some degree  age l i n e s )  r a t h e r  t han  e t h n i c  l i n e s .  
The economic and c u l t u r a l  t r e n d s  t h a t  d i s t a n c e  t h e  system o f  r ep roduc t ion  
o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  of product ion from product ion i t s e l f  have been underway 
f o r  a  s h o r t e r  t ime pe r iod  than  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ;  a t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l  working c l a s s  h a s  no t  on ly  been e t h n i c a l l y  homogeneous b u t  a l s o  
has  a  l o n q , s t a n d i n g  c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n .  The p o l i t i c a l  system is still  
c e n t r a l i z e d  and c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by nea r ly  t h i r t y - f i v e  y e a r s  o f  n a t i o n a l  
domination by a  s i n g l e  c e n t e r - r i g h t  p a r t y  ( t h e  DC), an e q u a l l y  long pe r iod  
o f  governmental exc lus ion  o f  t h e  o t h e r  major p a r t y  ( t h e  PCI) ,  and a  f a i r l y  
s i z e  number o f  s m a l l e r  p a r t i e s  which can on ly  e x e r c i s e  l eve rage  a s  "swing 
p a r t i e s "  and c o a l i t i o n  p a r t n e r s .  
Another c r u c i a l  s e t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  is r e l a t i v e  s i z e ,  s t r e n g t h .  
o f  t h e  economies, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n .  
So f a r  we have emphasized t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  The s i m i l a r i t i e s  
( a s i d e  from t h e  obvious  f a c t  t h a t  bo th  a r e  c a p i t a l i s t  democracies) come 
from t h e  c u r r e n t  economic c r i s i s .  
What a r e  t h e  outcomes f o r  s o c i a l  movements? I n  t h e  United S t a t e s  we 
f i n d  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  movements many o f  them concerned wi th  " l i f e s t y l e "  
( i . e . ,  RRP) i s s u e s ,  o p e r a t i n g  e i t h e r  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  p o l t i c a l  system o r  
a c t i n g  a s  p r e s s u r e  groups  w i t h i n  t h e  major p a r t i e s .  Movements do n o t  s t r o n g l y  
d e f i n e  themselves  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  c l a s s  base  and a r e  on ly  haphazardly  
l e f t - r i g h t  a l i g n e d .  
I n  I t a l y ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, we f i n d  a  s m a l l e r  number o f  movements 
( p a r t l y  because  movements can more e a s i l y  t u r n  i n t o  p a r t i e s ,  p a r t l y  because  
t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  l i f e  s t y l e  concerns  has  emerged l a t e r ) .  They a r e  more c l e a r l y  
a l i g n e d  a long a  l e f t - r i g h t  a x i s  and a r e  more i n t e g r a l l y  t i e d  t o  d e f i n a b l e  
c l a s s  bases .  The p o l i t i c a l  system is f a r  more c l e a r l y  t h e  t a c t i c a l  focus  
o f  t h e  movements and they  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  be  n a t i o n a l l y  o rgan ized  than  
American movements. 
This type of analysis suggests some predictions for the future. 
The most likely outcome is convergence of the characteristics of the 
U.S. and Italian social movement sectors. Why? 
First, the current crisis -- the shared conjunctural economic 
situation -- creates similar pressures in both. More specifically, we 
can expect more movements in the United States to define the situation as 
one of economic problems (i.e., to move at least slightly toward a class 
model of problems), to identify Washington as the source of problems (i.e., 
to take a more secularized, political and national view of problems), and 
to develop more politically-oriented tactics. The strong right-wing political 
thrust of the Moral Majority is an example of this potential shift. In 
this respect, we can expect a "Europeanization" of American social movement 
behavior, but with more popularly-based right wing movements and a continued 
interest in life style issues. 
On the other hand, short of a complete economic collapse, we can 
expect the distancing of the RRP from the system of production to continue 
in Italy as changing consumer and media habits generate a degree of 
Americanization. Shifts in concern from clearly class issues to life-style 
issues are most strongly heralded by the Radical Party with its emphasis 
not only on civil liberties but also on demands for decriminalization 
of all abortions (defeated in a referendum in May, 1981), 
abolition of hunting, and similar "American-style" questions1 these demands 
have been accompanied by "American-style" tactics like mass petition drives 
and the attempts to hold referenda. 
centered on issues of theinner life and religious communalism. At the same 
time this phenomenon reinforces our view of the middle strata as volatile 
in the contents and direction of their movements. 
 noth her pressure towards "Americanization" is the growing overlap of 
youth and a weak labor market position: this feature of the Italian economy 
has helped to create volatile and violent youth movements, increasingly 
detached from a working class base (that had still been connected to them 
in the "hot autumn" of 1969). 
Our remarks about the directions of the SMS in 1ialy and the United 
States should not obscure the larger message of this paper. The Social 
Movement sector differs between nations in both its size, organization, 
and orientation. Explaining this variety is a major item on the agenda 
of political sociology and social movement analysis. 
The emergence in recent years of a small but intense Catholic revi- 
talization movement, located in the Northern urban middle strata in Italy 
also supports the hypothesis of trends toward American-style movements, 
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